CONSPIRACY CRIMES (PART II)

18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)

The Crime
It is a crime under section 1956(h) for "any person" to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 1957. For more information about what constitutes a money laundering violation, please visit our money laundering page, here.

The Punishment
A violation of section 1956(h) is punishable in the same manner as if the offense had actually been committed. For more information about punishment under the money laundering statute, please visit our money laundering page, here.

Case Law Interpreting Section 1956(h)
Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687 (2005) (No. 03-1293).
This case presented the question "whether conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering … requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Whitfield at 689. The court held that it did not. Certiorari was granted so that the Court could resolve a circuit split about whether an overt act is required. The Eleventh Circuit, relying on United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), determined that proof of an overt act is not required. Whitfield at 690 (citing United States v. Hall, 349 F.3d 1320, 1324 (2003)). Other circuits, however, took the opposite position. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 1998)).

The Court determined that, "where Congress had omitted from the relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly requiring an overt act, the Court would not read such a requirement into the statute." Id. at 691. An attempt was also made to classify section 1956(h) as a penalty-enhancing provision rather than a separate offense, which would require the Government to prosecute money laundering conspiracies under section 371, but allow enhanced penalties under section 1956(h). Id. at 692. The court found this reasoning "untenable" for two reasons. First, the text of section 1956(h) is sufficient to establish an offense; the language is almost identical to that found in 21 U.S.C. § 846, the statute at issue in Shabani, which "indisputably created an offense." Id. Second, the argument that section 1956(h) is merely a penalty-enhancing provision would require a violation of section 371 be proved; "the text of [section] 1956(h) fails to provide any cross reference to [section] 371. Mere use of the word 'conspires' surely is not enough to establish the necessary link between these two separate statutes." Id.

21 U.S.C. § 846

The Crime
The language in 21 U.S.C. § 846 is similar to the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). It is a violation of section 846 for a person to attempt or conspire to commit any offense defined in title 21. For more information about what constitutes a violation of title 21, please visit our drug crimes page, here.

The Punishment
The punishment under section 846, is also similar to the punishment provisions of section 1956(h). A violation of section 846 is punishable in the same manner as if the offense had actually been committed. For more information of how a violation of title 21 is punished, please visit our drug crimes page, here.

Case Law Interpreting Section 1956(h)
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
This case deals with the question of whether section 846, "the drug conspiracy statute, requires the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Shabani at 11. Unsurprisingly, the Court concluded that it did not. Id. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of section 846. Id. The indictment, however, failed to allege the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which, the defendant argued, was an essential element of the offense. Id. Certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict among the circuits whether proof of an overt act is required. Id. at 12. The Court determined that the language does not require "that an overt act be committed to further the conspiracy, and [it has] not inferred such a requirement from congressional silence in other conspiracy statutes." Id. at 13. Since 18 U.S.C. § 371 "contains an explicit requirement that a conspirator 'do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy' … Congress' silence in [section] 846 speaks volumes. After all, the general conspiracy statute preceded and presumably provided the framework for the more specific drug conspiracy statute." Id. at 14.